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Supply chains and unfree labour: regulatory failure in the case of Samsung 




The protection of labour rights of temporary migrant workers in global supply chains 
requires further theoretical and policy research. Through the case of Serbian workers 
in Slovak electronics supply chains, we look at how the transnational recruitment of 
labour via temporary work agencies (TWAs) for globally organised production 
generates heightened forms of exploitation and unfree labour relations. We show that 
such exploitation occurs in a regulatory framework consisting of various instruments 
ranging from the Palermo Protocol specific to trafficking, to EU law addressing the 
mobility of workers, and corporate codes of conduct aimed at guaranteeing worker 
rights within supply chains. Paradoxically, despite an overregulated field, existing 
instruments fail to offer a straightforward avenue for redress. We suggest that this 
failure is an outcome of the current legal and corporate regulatory matrix that allows 
market competition through work practices that violate basic labour standards and 
produce the conditions that enable and sustain unfree labour relations, while 






Supply chains and unfree labour: regulatory failure in the case of Samsung 





This article uses the case study of electronics manufacturing in Slovakia to examine 
the scope of regulatory failure in relation to exploitative working conditions in global 
supply chains. Unfree labour relations were exposed in Slovakia’s electronics industry 
when, on 17 October 2017, Slovak police arrested and detained 23 Serbian workers 
for illegal work at a supplier for Samsung Electronics, a South Korean multinational 
(MNC). Serbian workers, despite being in possession of formal contracts specifying 
that they were being ‘posted’ to Slovakia for temporary engagement, have been the 
subject of fraud and deception with respect to pay, working time, health insurance and 
social security contributions. They were moreover locked into contracts whereby they 
were liable to pay damages to the employer if they left or switched employers during 
the probation period. Finally, even though they worked at Samsung plant in Slovakia, 
they were recruited by a Serbian agency, signed a contract with a Hungarian agency, 
and then were paid by a Slovak agency. The workers did not know for whom they 
worked. 
 
At first glance, the situation outlined above could be seen as governed by several 
different sources of regulatory authority such as the Palermo Protocol, international 
and Council of Europe human rights law, and European Union (EU) law. We might 




assistance. The research question we pose is: Given the current proliferation of 
regulatory mechanisms at international, regional level as well as company CSR 
policies, do these offer means of effective redress, legal or otherwise? By placing the 
category of temporary migrant workers at the core of our analysis, we illustrate 
considerable limitations in the application of existing protections to the category of 
workers pivotal to the functioning of global supply chains.   In other words, the case 
of Serbian workers in Slovakia exemplifies a regulatory failure of diverse hard, soft 
and non-legal systems to prevent the conditions in which unfree labour can thrive.  
 
In order to understand how regulatory failure comes about, we suggest that there is, in 
particular, a need to examine the restructuring of global production whereby firms 
contract out parts of the labour process to other companies, creating a long 
subcontracting chain (Wagner, 2015). We build on scholarship on supply chains that 
has been investigating the role of unfree labour relations in sustaining the functioning 
of globally integrated circuits of production through delivery of flexible and high-
speed production (Barrientos, 2013; Phillips and Mieres, 2015). We expand on 
current literature on unfree labour in supply chains by focusing in particular on 
subcontracting. Subcontracting, as we suggest through our analysis of the role of 
formal temporary work agencies (TWAs), creates uncertainty about accountability 
and makes it difficult to locate the source of control within the chain. By putting 
TWAs’ operations at the centre of our analysis, we show that subcontracting is not 
just about recruitment and leasing of workers but rather about a comprehensive 
management of migrant labour that encompasses the control over recruitment, labour 
process as well as workers’ private spheres. Our thesis is that dispersion of 




permitting the growth of TWAs and enabling new severe modalities of exploitation 
that fall within the gaps of existing multiple regulatory mechanisms. Given the 
relevance for temporary migrant workers for the global organisation of production, 
we argue that regulatory failure is the result of the current legal and corporate 
regulatory matrix which allows market competition through work practices that 
violate basic labour standards, while facilitate normalization of exploitation and 
unfree labour relations in the global supply chains.  
 
 
Broadening the field: from human trafficking to forced and unfree labour 
 
The fifteenth anniversary of the 2000 United Nations (UN) Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children 
(hereafter the Protocol), provided an opportunity to evaluate its impact on the 
problems it targets. Unlike many other international legal instruments, the Protocol, as 
Jacqueline Bhabha put it, has been ‘widely ratified, its definition of trafficking has 
been extensively invoked, its criminalization mandates have been aggressively 
followed, its victim protection measures have been enthusiastically cited’ (2015: 3). 
One of the Protocol’s key achievements has been formulation of a unitary definition 
of what constitutes trafficking (Wijers, 2015), which was a precondition for the 
development of an anti-trafficking normative framework for global action (Gallagher, 
2015). In addition, the Protocol had a generative impact on domestic anti-trafficking 
legislation in that, as for example in the case of the United Kingdom, it broadened and 
modernized outdated domestic understandings of human exploitation (Parkes, 2015).  




was established as a supplement to the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime and located within the sphere of international criminal law, states 
have tended to view trafficking as a security threat (Gómez-Mera, 2017) to be 
combatted by strengthening border control and immigration policies (Andrijasevic, 
2010; Mai, 2016). The overriding emphasis placed on trafficking as a crime against 
the state (Coghlan and Wylie, 2011) resulted in vague and often weak provisions for 
victim protection. For a widely ratified law enforcement tool, the Protocol achieved 
an extremely low conviction rate for traffickers (Gallagher, 2001; Kangaspunta, 
2015). Instead, anti-trafficking measures generate and justify raids on irregular 
migrants and migrant workers (Kempadoo, Sanghera and Pattanaik, 2015). In this 
way, punitive immigration and border controls have strengthened the industry 
associated with trafficking and exacerbated migrants’ vulnerability.  
The Protocol is widely recognized as establishing an artificial and unworkable 
distinction between trafficking and smuggling (Brhane, 2015). For example, migrants 
might voluntarily enter into an employment agreement and only subsequently realize 
that they were deceived and find themselves in a situation of forced labour 
(Chantavanich et al, 2016). The problem, Wijers (2015) suggests, is that the Protocol 
prioritises the use of force in the recruitment and transportation ‘phase’ of trafficking 
rather that subsequent coercive labour relations in the workplace. This has meant that 
authorities often do not regard as trafficked those workers who were willing to remain 
in exploitative workplaces after initial transportation (Coghlan and Wylie, 2011). 
Moreover, the binary distinction between free and unfree labour reinforced the idea 
that forced labour is an ‘aberration’ (Phillips and Mieres, 2015: 245) from the normal 




These shortcomings, scholars concur, are due to the fact that the adoption of the 
Palermo Protocol as well as implementation of anti-trafficking policies suffer a 
significant gender bias observable from the overwhelming focus these place on 
women, children and sex work (Gallagher, 2001; Marks and Olsen, 2015). In fact, the 
Protocol has often been used as an instrument of social control to criminalize and 
remove migrant sex workers from their working environment (Grupo Davida, 2015; 
Jahnsen and Skilbrei, 2015; Kotiswaran, 2015). Consequently, the Protocol has been 
critiqued for viewing forced labour in isolation from the broader context of 
immigration and work and for failing to acknowledge labour exploitation affecting a 
broad constituency of marginal workers (Kotiswaran, 2015). In addition, as forced 
labour is often lodged within distinct racialised legacies and correlated with labour 
markets in former colonies and undeveloped economies (Kempadoo, 2015), it is seen 
as a feature of pre-capitalist economies that are not yet fully developed or integrated 
into global production circuits (Strauss and McGrath, 2017). It follows that instances 
of forced labour have typically been studied as separate from the labour markets in 
the advanced capitalist economies and apart from global networks of production.  
Acknowledging these shortcomings has resulted in a conceptual and policy shift 
towards an approach that sees the violation of labour rights as a structural 
phenomenon and the product of the buyer-driven global supply chains. In order to 
unpack how labour becomes unfree and the mechanisms by which coercion and 
control are imposed and upheld, scholars examine the commercial dynamics driving 
global production. Sourcing by larger brands is increasingly taking place through 
chains or networks of suppliers and contractors, usually in geographically dispersed 
locations. These chains are characterised by a significant imbalance of power between 




are produced and where (Azmeh and Nadvi, 2014). Lead firms’ outsourcing of 
higher-cost and higher-risk aspect of production and distribution to the suppliers 
creates intense commercial pressure on conditions of price and supply along the 
chain. The low profit margins available to the suppliers, in turn, place downward 
pressure on wages and working conditions and give rise to various forms of 
exploitative work (Mayer and Phillips, 2017).  
Temporary workers therefore fulfil industries’ need for an ‘on demand’ workforce 
that can be ‘assembled’ on short notice when orders are high and when orders are low 
can be ‘let go’, on equally short notice. As contractors are unable to find workers in 
sufficient numbers locally, this demand is met by temporary migrant workers. Hence, 
as Barrientos (2013: 1066) puts it so succinctly, ‘The labour contracting system is 
[…] integral to the flexible commercial functioning of [Global Production Networks] 
GPNs across borders in a liberalised global economy.’ In this context, scholars have 
coined several new terms, such as ‘labour chains’ (Barrientos, 2013) and ‘human 
supply chains’ (Gordon, 2017) to indicate the transnational process through which 
labour is recruited, put to work and confined. In addition, they have shifted the 
attention from the force at the point of entry to the force in the labour process as a 
whole. Concepts such as unfree labour as a ‘multi-dimensional concept’ (McGrath, 
2013), ‘free-unfree continuum’ (Sarkar, 2017) and ‘continuum of exploitation’ 
(Strauss and McGrath, 2017) all suggest that deception, coercion and vulnerability 
occur along the chain from recruitment through until the exit stage.  
This conceptual shift went hand in hand with a policy shift. This shift is best 
conveyed as a move away from the Palermo Protocol and towards a combination of 




transnational supply chains. For example, in the absence of an effective regime that 
regulates actions of TWAs in another state or which holds firms accountable for the 
action of foreign labour intermediaries, Gordon (2017) argues that the solution is to 
institute full chain liability for all actors. For Coghlan and Wylie (2011) regulation 
should instead take place at the national level via increase in labour inspection and 
enforcement of national labour legislation. Given that transnational and national 
regulation suffers from profound weaknesses, Feasley (2016: 16) suggests setting up 
of a hybrid regime that consists of ‘international human rights accountability 
principles codified through state-supported legislation with buy-in from the business 
community’. Finally, those scholars skeptical about the effectiveness of national 
labour laws, international human rights principles, and corporate codes of conduct 
suggest a bottom-up approach based on worker participation and voice (Brudney, 
2016).  
Taken together, Gómez-Mera (2017) suggests that combined public and private law 
approaches can play an important role in complementing the Palermo Protocol and in 
contributing to fill legal and implementation gaps in the early international 
cooperation against trafficking in persons. We are less confident that this objective 
has yet been realized. Drawing on our empirical case study of Serbian workers in 
Slovak electronics supply chain we will show that despite the existence of diverse 
hard, soft and non-legal regulatory systems, workers have nevertheless suffered 
severe exploitation and unfree labour relations. We observe, following Thomas 
(2011), a convergence of diverse systems relating to criminal justice, migration and 
labour, and trade and how these fail to prevent and arguably even legitimate and 
enable some of the worst forms of exploitation. We illustrate how legal and other 




then exploited by businesses, whether the TWAs supplying the workers or the lead 
firms that benefit from migrant worker labour. In doing so, we argue that harms to 
temporary migrant workers are structural in that they are the product both of the 
transnational dispersion of production as well as the converging legal regimes that 
leave those segments of the workforce - pivotal for delivery of fast and flexible 
production- outside the ambit of labour protection laws. 
 
Methodology 
The case we outline draws on primary research conducted by one of the authors in 
Nitra, Slovakia and secondary data compiled from newspaper articles, websites, and 
NGO reports in Serbian and Slovak languages. The case study we present here is part 
of a larger research project on electronics supply chain that studies the impact of 
global organisation of production on management practices and labour rights in CEE. 
In that studies of electronics industry in CEE are rather dated (cf. Bormann and Plank, 
2010), a qualitative case study was best suited to gain in-depth understanding of the 
globalised production systems and transnational market for labour. Samsung is a 
South Korean MNC and was chosen in that it is one of the world’s largest and most 
influential electronics lead firms that relies heavily on subcontracting. Samsung’s 
plants in Slovakia are assembly plants and make extensive use of temporary workers 
recruited abroad.   
Primary research took place in Nitra in 2016 and it consisted of interviews with 
workers (6), TWAs (6), trade unionists (2), local labour office (1) and labour 
inspectorate (1). Multiple respondents enabled the project to address different topics 




questions from more than one respondent. The bulk of data that underpins the case 
study comes from interactions with workers housed in a dormitory and from 
observations gathered at the dormitory regarding migrant workers living conditions 
and their daily routines. All interviews, apart from those with workers, were 
conducted in respective workplaces. Interviews with workers were conducted outside 
the workplace, in bars, parks and dormitories in order to guarantee participants’ 
anonymity.  
In terms of data analysis, the primary data was coded by hand to identify the main 
overarching themes and then used qualitative software (NVivo) to create more 
detailed labels for each theme. The data was then triangulated with information from 
secondary sources on recruitment and work and employment practices. Secondary 
sources consisted of the Facebook page of a TWA under scrutiny here that detailed 
the terms of contract for temporary work in Slovakia; newspaper articles in Serbian 
and Slovak outlets discussing the case of Serbian workers in Slovakia; a report written 
by ASTRA, a Belgrade-based anti-trafficking NGO; and a confidential country report 
on Samsung in Slovakia written for industriALL European Trade Union. 
Triangulation allowed a crosscheck of the accuracy of information gathered regarding 
recruitment and work and employment practices as well as remuneration and labour 
rights violations.  
 
Workers’ experiences of unfree labour relations  
Serbian workers are recruited in their country of origin via TWAs. The TWA we 
focus on here, one of many, is called (we use an acronym) LP. Its headquarters are in 




workers, LP claimed to have placed 8000 workers with 100 foreign firms. Its Serbian 
website and Facebook page expressed interest in recruiting two categories of workers 
for jobs in Slovakia: non-EU nationals (i.e. workers from Serbia, Bosnia and 
Montenegro), and EU nationals (i.e. Croatian or Hungarian citizens resident in 
Serbia). Jobs available were in the food, automotive and electronics industry. LP 
offered quite detailed information regarding recruitment and working conditions. The 
pay would be €2.20 per hour with an expectation that there would be enough work so 
that one could earn €500 or more per month, although the responsibility to provide 
work would lie not with the Serbian but the Slovak agency. Non-EU workers were 
informed they could only stay for up to 90 days and could return to work in Slovakia 
again only after 90 days in Serbia. EU workers could stay longer and earn eventually 
€3 – €5 per hour; after a year, they could be hired directly by the employer. Payment 
of wages would take place on the 16th day of every month. Shifts would be twelve 
hours with a thirty-minute unpaid break permitted only if line managers allow for it. 
Food could be prepared at the dormitory or bought from the factory canteen for 
approximately €3. If workers were to leave before the end of contractual 90 days, they 
would lose the Samsung bonus (25 per cent), the LP bonus (10 per cent) and would 
have to pay a fine of €30. 
 
Transport by coach from Serbia to Slovakia was free. When boarding the bus, 
workers needed to buy seven days mandatory travel insurance for approximately €11 
as requested by Hungarian authorities when entering the country. The work contract, 
covering injuries at work, would get signed in Slovakia and the terms of the contract 
were to be discussed with the Slovak branch. If ill, workers were to report to the 




costs. If the workers did not perform satisfactorily during their initial 10 days 
probation period, switched agencies during their contract, or were made redundant, 
they could be sent back to Serbia and were to arrange and pay for their own 
transportation. This is why LP recommended that workers should always have €30-50 
in cash. In Slovakia, Serbian workers were to be provided with ‘free’ accommodation 
and transport to the assembly plant. If workers did not work or were fired, they had to 
pay for the accommodation themselves and were to leave the dormitory immediately.  
 
Once in Slovakia, many workers realised that they had been the subject of fraud and 
deception. According to Sani Dermaku, the Serbian ambassador to Bratislava, every 
month his staff helps Serbs who say they were deceived by TWAs and who have no 
money, or no passport because their agency confiscated it. This is consistent with the 
findings of a Belgrade NGO specialising in trafficking, ASTRA. The deception 
consists in the fact that workers earned less than they were originally promised, not 
because they were not paid the notified hourly rates, but due to inaccuracy of the 
information LP provided about quantity of work. While there was work during high 
season going from November to March, when one can earn reasonable weekly pay 
through working twelve hours a day six days a week, in the low season one could 
only work four days and earn €350 - 400 per month maximum.  
 
While workers were indeed not charged for accommodation and transport to the 
worksite, these costs were de facto deducted from their salaries. As the head of an 
agency explained in an interview, the standard practice is to deduct about €165 from 
workers’ wages, depending on the quality of the dormitory. In addition, some workers 




10% bonus from the agency for regular work attendance. Instead, they had to take on 
overtime work as otherwise they could face dismissal. If workers were absent three 
times, even in case of illness, they were let go. Holiday entitlements and rest break 
entitlements were rarely observed. No worker seemed to be paid in accordance with 
deductions for social security or had health cover. In addition, the contract the 
workers signed once in Slovakia specified that if they left during the notice period 
(presumably the 10 days probation but not clarified in the contract), workers would 
have to pay damages to the employer totalling their entire pay. Salaries were paid in 
cash once a week at the dormitories and as no worker was provided with a pay slip or 
bank transfer, it was impossible to challenge any deductions or non-payment. The 
dormitory in which the workers were accommodated was in the middle of industrial 
ruins. It was difficult for workers to go into town as to do so one needed to cross the 
fields or walk on the highway. When they did so, police would fine them, as 
pedestrians are not allowed onto the highway. In addition to spatial isolation, workers 
also experienced social isolation as they were not allowed to bring friends to the 
dormitories.  
 
Workers referred to the work at Samsung as ‘rad na crno’ or ‘black work’ by which 
they meant that this is illegal work and that they were not registered anywhere as 
employed. They reported that, at the border, they were instructed by LP staff to say 
they were visiting relatives and not mention work or the recruiting agency. For 
workers this meant that their social security contributions back home were not paid as 
that they were officially deemed as unemployed by the Serbian state while at the same 
time unprotected in the Slovak host State. Workers were also unclear whom to contact 




contract with the Hungarian agency, and then effectively worked in Slovakia and 
were paid by the Slovak agency. For some workers the situation got even more 
complicated when LP in Serbia was shut down and they were told to sign 
immediately a new contract (no translation was provided) with a Romanian branch, as 
they would otherwise receive no pay.  
 
The inability to redress work related irregularities was compounded by significant 
barriers to protecting rights through union membership or labour inspection. 
Slovakian unions have been concerned by the presence of agency workers which 
depresses local wages.1 Rather than seeking to represent agency workers, they have 
organised protests in response to their increasing numbers.2 The labour inspectorate 
views these workers as engaged in illegal work. This has resulted in situations where 
the labour inspectorate reported cases of illicit work to the police who then arrested 
Serbian agency workers, placed several workers in the detention centre for illegal 
immigrants and then deported them (Chudžíková and Bargerová, 2018: 13).  
 
Overall, this is a workforce caught within the supply chain that they have entered 
voluntarily but that they find difficult to exit as they are tied into a contract with a 
particular employer, under a menace of penalty and/or non-payment of wages, subject 
to illicit deductions from pay, vulnerable to deportation, risking homelessness because 




2 See protests in Voderada (http://rs.n1info.com/a251475/Svet/Svet/Slovacka-Peticija-






meaningful legal protections. We will see that these are perils enabled by the EU 
posting of workers regime, against which international human rights law and 
corporate codes of conduct do not protect them.  
 
What protections for temporary migrant agency workers?  
 
Our suggestion is that regularity failure in case of Serbian workers in Slovakia’s 
electronics supply chains is the outcome of the current legal and corporate regulatory 
matrix. We examine first what entitlements this group has under international human 
rights and protection from trafficking; then we turn to the European law and the 
transnational initiatives relating to corporate codes of conduct to examine the degree 
to which these offer protection.  
 
International human rights of migrant workers and protections from trafficking 
 
The best scenario is that these workers can claim equal access to justice and equal 
treatment of terms and conditions in parity with local workers, by virtue of 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) Conventions Nos 97 and 143 and the UN 
International Convention on the protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and 
their Families 1990 (ICRMW). However, these instruments make exceptions for 
treatment of temporary migrant workers (Fudge, 2012-13) and while Serbia has (at 
least in part) ratified these instruments, the other states connected to our case study 





It may still be argued that as all the states concerned are ILO members, they are 
obliged to adhere to the ‘core’ labour standards, which are constitutional principles set 
out in ILO Declarations of 1998 and 2008, including freedom of association and 
prevention of forced labour. These are notably also entitlements of all workers as 
‘human rights’ by virtue of the UN Covenants of 1966 and the Council of Europe’s 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 
(ECHR) to which the states concerned are all signatories. Moreover, ‘just conditions 
of work’ under Article 7 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
1966 should be applicable, albeit subject to ‘available resources’.  
 
Potential assistance for those workers recruited under false pretences from Serbia to 
Slovakia could potentially arise as victims of trafficking. There would seem to have 
been ‘fraud’ and ‘deception’ under Article 3 of the Palermo Protocol, as well as 
servitude imposed by the contractual conditions which bind these agency workers to 
the TWA and their ultimate hirer, Samsung. The apparent consent of some workers to 
exploitative conditions in advance of their travel and/or their acceptance of further 
terms subsequent to their transport may seem to exclude them from the Protocol’s 
protection (Coghlan and Wylie, 2011), although such a narrow interpretation of the 
Protocol would be highly problematic in a situation where workers are economically 
desperate and forced to make strategic choices that are exploited by others (Shamir, 
2012). One would hope that an argument can be made along the lines of an ‘abuse of 
power’. Those subject to readily identifiable fraud and deception at the outset as 
identified by ASTRA, or who were kept deprived of their passports and capacity to 





Under Article 7 of the Palermo Protocol, the State need only ‘consider’ measures to 
permit victims of trafficking to stay in country, which did not prevent deportations of 
Serbian workers in the tech industry from Slovakia. Moreover, distinction in 
treatment on the basis of nationality of a worker is permitted under International 
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965 insofar as 
States have the ability to determine immigration and work-related access to their 
sovereign domain. This means that without some particular agreement between Serbia 
and Slovakia, the Slovakian Government remains within its rights to detain and deport 
Serbian workers who have entered illegally, even if the illegality was due to control 
exercised over them by a third party, namely a TWA.  
 
There is considerable litigation on slavery, forced labour and servitude under Article 4 
of the ECHR and the significance of the need for protections is reflected in the 
Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings 2005 
(to which all four States are again parties). Much of this concerns domestic workers 
deceived and imprisoned;3 and, in Rantsev, the case of a nightclub worker in Cyprus 
where the police colluded with her detention by her employer.4 Industrial workers 
temporarily placed by agencies with high tech firms abroad do not however fit with 
the usual profile. The actions of a large multinational high-tech firm and extensive 
agency businesses (spanning various states) which supply labour to such companies 
are not likely to be viewed as suspect in the way as holding a young girl hostage. We 
have yet to see a case in which large scale corporate abuse is subjected to criticism, 
 
3 E.g. SILIADIN v. FRANCE. (Application no. 73316/01). JUDGMENT. 
STRASBOURG. 26 July 2005. FINAL. 26/10/2005. 
4 RANTSEV v. CYPRUS AND RUSSIA. (Application no. 25965/04). JUDGMENT. 




although Chowdhury suggests that this could be possible where the scale of such 
abuse is at its most extreme (in that case opening gunfire on unarmed agricultural 
workers).5 The danger is that lower levels of exploitation can be seen as inherent and 
hence ‘acceptable’ within certain economic sectors (Coghlan and Wylie, 2011: 1519), 
such that the category of ‘victims of trafficking’ and forced labour come to apply only 
to a very small group of workers experiencing the most extreme conditions (McGrath, 
2017). If trafficking and forced labour are viewed as merely opposite to free labour 
and therefore as ‘atypical exceptions’ (Calvao, 2016), they may serve to normalize 
exploitation.    
 
The use of EU law and the EU posting of work regime 
 
EU workers have free movement rights and are entitled to move to another EU 
Member State without a visa, work there without a work permit and, to the extent that 
they are able to support themselves, reside there for an indefinite period of time. This 
necessitates under Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) ‘the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers … 
as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment’. 
So it makes sense that, in this study, Croatian and Hungarian nationals hired from 
Serbia were not restricted as to the duration of their stay in Slovakia, whereas Serbian 
nationals were hired on the basis that they would return home after 90 days. EU 
workers are also entitled to the same pay and terms and conditions as local home state 
(here Slovakian) workers.  
 
5 CHOWDURY AND OTHERS V GREECE (Application No. 21884/15). 





However, if these EU workers are only temporarily ‘posted’ from one EU Member 
State to another with the intention that they will briefly perform certain services (for a 
service provider) in the host State and then return to their home State, then they are 
viewed in terms of the employer’s right to free movement of services (under Article 
56 TFEU) and other rules apply.6 In that ‘posting’ is considered a movement of 
services rather than workers, posted workers are notionally regarded as not gaining 
‘access to the labour market’ of the Member State to which they move and industrial 
action aimed at securing them the same rights as local workers has been regarded as 
in violation of an employer’s free movement rights7 (Hayes and Novitz, 2013; Novitz, 
2018). Exceptions which apply to temporary migrant workers under international 
instruments apply in a more extensive way under EU law.  
 
Cases of posting are covered by the Posting of Workers Directive (PWD), now 
supplemented by an ‘Enforcement Directive’ and amended in 2018 under an 
Amending PWD operational from 2020.8 The PWD requires the host EU country to 
guarantee workers a set of core rights in force in the host state. These consist of 
 
6 Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2007] ECR 
I-11767 (Laval). 
7 See C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa v Office national d'immigration [1990] ECR I-1417; 
[1991] 2 CMLR 818 [1990] ECR 1417, para 15.  
8 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16.12.96 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services 
[1997] OJ L18/1 (PWD); see also the supplementary Dir 2014/67/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the enforcement of Dir 96/71/EC 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services and 
amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation through the 
Internal Market Information System (Enforcement Dir 2014); and Dir 2018/957/EU 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 June 2018 amending Dir 96/71 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services 
(Amending PWD 2018). This amendment must be implemented by member states by 




minimum rates of pay (under the Amending PWD now ‘remuneration’); maximum 
work periods and minimum rest periods; minimum paid annual leave; the conditions 
of hiring out workers through temporary work agencies; health, safety and hygiene at 
work; and equal treatment between men and women. There is now express protection 
of a right to strike in Article 1a of the Amending PWD, but this will remain difficult 
to exercise in practical terms given linguistic and often physical barriers to effective 
action, and in legal terms for its aims and effects will still have to be balanced against 
an employer’s free movement rights under the TFEU.   
 
It is difficult to establish whether Serbian workers were paid the minimum national 
wage in Slovakia which was then €405 per month. In the contract that we had the 
chance to examine, workers were paid €352 payment per month for 176 hours of 
work. This is after the agencies subtracted €160 per month for accommodation and 
€30 for transport to work. So, the notional payment per month could be regarded as 
€532, but we doubt this was a fair cost and deduction. The dormitory accommodation 
was of a low quality and the workers had no option to leave the site. Further, the 
solitude of the dormitories as well as workers’ linguistic isolation meant they had 
minimal opportunities to pursue rights to Protocol rights, non-discriminatory 
treatment under EU law or even the minimal guarantees available under the PWD. 
 
It also became evident that workers recruited via LP were not all genuinely 
temporary. Several interviewed said that they had been working through agencies for 
Samsung for years. This is a common plight of posted workers now addressed by the 
Amending PWD of 2018, which from 2020 will require member states to set a 12 (or 




(as opposed to equality) approach of the PWD.  
In addition, the posting regime only applies to workers who are in ‘an employment 
relationship’, whether with the employer from their host State or with the agency in 
question. It is complicated to establish the identity of the employer, as the Serbian 
subsidiary was responsible for the recruitment, the Hungarian one for the employment 
contract and a Slovak agency for the accommodation, food and remuneration in 
Slovakia. This illustrates the difficulty of determining who the employer is in 
contemporary supply and global value chains (Prassl, 2015). The PWD also applies 
only to the temporary movement of workers between EU Member States. It is 
questionable whether import of labour from Serbia should be covered, but arguably 
travel through Hungary and that a Hungarian, Romanian or Slovakian agency did the 
hiring may make this possible. If not, then immigration provisions operating between 
Serbia and Slovakia apply. 
The capacity of third country nationals to exercise mobility under the PWD is not 
explicitly set out there. But it has come to be accepted that the host Member State 
may not impose administrative formalities or additional conditions on posted workers 
who are third-country nationals when they are lawfully employed by a service 
provider established in another Member State.9 The difficulty in our case is trying to 
assess whether we could describe the Serbian workers as lawfully engaged in 
Hungary before their arrival in Slovakia. This seems more doubtful and depends more 
on the individual discretion of the Member States involved. An interview with the 
Hungarian Ministry of Labour conducted by the Prague-based MKC revealed that 
 
9 See Intra-EU Mobility of Third-country Nationals, European Migration Network 
Study 2013, at 28, citing inter alia Case C-43/93 Vander Elst, judgment of 9 August 




much depended on the requests made by multinational companies on a pragmatic 
temporary staff basis:  
‘There is the opportunity to post workers to Hungary from neighbouring 
countries (not EU member States: Ukraine and Serbia) for a specific time and 
for a specific location, in some clearly defined professions, without work and 
residence permit. […] Inspection of these posted workers is complicated in 
Hungary … and even more complicated of course, when they show up in other 
countries as re-posted workers.’   
Potential re-posting is clearly visible in our case study. Once LP in Serbia got shut 
down by the authorities, workers whose contracts were with a Hungarian subsidiary 
of LP, were straightaway put on new contracts with a Romanian company. This 
operating of labour intermediaries and legal ambiguity as to the origins of the workers 
makes enforcement of the minimum entitlements under the Posting of Workers 
Directive near impossible. It appears that corporate entities, both the agencies and the 
large corporations to whom they supply labour, are exploiting this uncertainty as to 
the remit of the posting provisions which apply under EU law. 
 
Codes of corporate social responsibility 
Samsung has put in place several codes of social responsibility, which creates 
uncertainty and confusion as to the appropriate source of recourse for workers. Those 
most relevant for our analysis are the ‘Samsung Global Code of Conduct’, 10 
 




‘Responsible Management of Supply Chains’11 and the ‘Samsung Migrant Worker 
Guidelines’. 12   
 
The Samsung ‘Global Code of Conduct’ explicitly puts shareholders and maximising 
profit as company’s main objective (Principle 3.2) but does makes provision for 
employees’ ‘quality of life’, ‘equal opportunities’ and ‘capabilities’ (Principle 3.3). 
International labour standards are only expressly recognised in relation to health and 
safety of ‘employees’ (Principle 3.4).  
 
The code relating to ‘Responsible Management of Supply Chain’ requests that the 
suppliers abide by international standards and regulations. Labour standards are 
covered in the new Supplier Registration program operated by Samsung, consisting of 
‘mandatory on-site audits on 20 articles, including voluntary work, compliance with 
work hour regulations, and ban on discrimination’. This however is not in line with 
the ILO core labour standards, which include freedom of association and forced 
labour. Nor does the internal audit envisaged map onto the rigorous due diligence 
processes recommended in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(2011).  
 
The ‘Migrant Worker Guidelines’ (the Guidelines) adopted most recently in 
December 2016 undertake to respect the local labour laws of the states in which 
Samsung operates as well as international labour standards. The Guidelines provide a 
broad definition of a ‘migrant worker’ (namely ‘a person who is engaged or has been 
 






engaged in a remunerated activity in a state in which he or she is not a national and 
has to move from one country to another for the purpose of employment’) and covers 
hire through ‘recruitment agencies’. It would therefore seem to cover our Slovakian 
case study and seems generous, envisaging that Samsung shall ‘provide migrant 
workers with opportunities, treatment, working and living conditions, wage rates for 
jobs performed, shift arrangements, holidays, and working hours equivalent to that 
provided for local workers…  except where different terms are specified under 
applicable local laws and regulations’ (para 9.4). This does not seem to have occurred 
in Slovakia, perhaps because of the ways in which hiring has occurred through TWAs 
and the lack of coverage by trade unions.13 On payment of wages, para. 9.7 envisages 
direct payment by Samsung to workers ‘not less than the minimum wage’ and into the 
worker’s bank account. Although there is provision to pay by cash if the worker does 
not have a bank account, and there is to be a written statement outlining all lawful 
deductions. Once again, this did not occur with regard to Serbian agency workers in 
our case study who were paid in cash by the TWAs.  
 
Further, there is to be ‘no unreasonable restrictions on migrant workers’ freedom of 
movement in the facilities or accommodations’ (paras 9.9 and 9.10). Under para. 10 
migrant workers are to have full rights to freedom of association, being free to join a 
trade union in ‘accordance with applicable local laws and regulations.’ This is of 
particular significance, given Samsung’s historical opposition to trade union 
representation.14 However, there is no acknowledgement that the restricted and 
 
13 See the view of Emil Machyna, chair of OZ KOVO, the Slovak organisation 






isolated conditions under which the migrant workers live (where they cannot host 
visitors) are unlikely to enable such representation. There is also a commitment to pay 
for repatriation at the end of a contract, but not in cases of dismissal due to 
misconduct (para. 11) and a grievance mechanism accompanies the procedure (para. 
12). There is no recognition of the types of penalties imposed by TWAs in our case 
study. 
 
Ultimately, implementation of the Guidelines seems to rest on the same voluntary 
commitment and self-regulation as for the ‘Responsible Management of Supply 
Chain’ Code. These codes of conduct are not legally binding, but merely statements 
of intent designed perhaps not so much to affect conduct within supply chains but the 
reputation of the corporate entity; nor is it clear how they bind the TWAs which 
supply Samsung with its labour. The Guidelines state that they have been adopted as 
‘a dedicated member of the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC)’ and 
seemed to follow adoption in 2015 of a comparable ‘Supply Chain Foreign Migrant 
Worker Standard’ by Hewlett Packard, indicating recent awareness of the reputational 
difficulties of continuing current arrangements. These codes are indicative not so 
much of the goodwill of corporations in the tech industry, but rather the relative 
‘powerlessness’ (Blackett, 2001) and unwillingness of States in opposing their 
business practices and point to the ‘outsourced governance’ (Mayer and Phillips, 
2017) through which States explicitly delegate governance functions and authority to 
private actors and standards.. While the Samsung codes are suggestive of respect for 
human rights standards, they are selective in their coverage (omitting for example 
trade union rights which could secure assistance for the most vulnerable workers). 




of the Palermo Protocol and specific international and European labour standards.  
 
Discussion and conclusions  
Our analysis of the regulatory framework illustrates that harms to temporary migrant 
workers are structural and a product of the global market for labour. In addition they 
are permitted and enabled by current regulatory framework consisting of various 
instruments ranging from the Palermo Protocol specific to trafficking, to EU law 
addressing the mobility of workers, and corporate codes of conduct aimed at 
guaranteeing workers rights within supply chains, all of which fail to offer labour 
protection or clear means of legal redress to this group of workers.  
 
We welcome scholarly and policy efforts to move away from the Palermo Protocol 
and towards a labour rights perspective on forced labour. These efforts emerged due 
to the well-demonstrated weaknesses of the Palermo Protocol. The first one regards 
its implementation concentrated on individual criminal and victims rather than on 
structural causes of human trafficking. The second one concerns its accompanying 
criminal justice centric approach that privileged prosecution rather than protection 
and prevention. There has therefore been a conceptual shift towards unfree labour 
relations in supply chains and policy shift towards regulating activities of a variety of 
cross-border actors, including MNCs, which in theory should cast a broader net than 
the Palermo Protocol alone so as to guarantee human rights protections and labour 
standards. It is therefore rather paradoxical that the Palermo Protocol might be the 
only instrument that may potentially offer some limited protection to the Serbian 





We can also observe that, far from being just located abroad (see Gordon, 2017) or 
informal and unregistered (see Barrientos, 2013), TWAs operate across national 
borders as formally registered companies. LP had a registered office in Slovakia and 
subsidiaries registered in Hungary and Serbia, which then could utilize the legal 
regimes applicable to EU vis-à-vis non-EU states in calculated ways, playing on the 
grey areas in the posting of workers and trafficking regimes, as well as the gaps (and 
overlaps) in corporate codes. Moreover, apart from traditional recruitment of workers, 
TWAs are diversifying their operations to include transportation and housing of 
workers as well as direct management of production, whereas previously it could be 
assumed that such responsibilities lie with the firm (Purcell et al., 2004). In this way, 
as Andrijasevic and Sacchetto (2017) convincingly demonstrate, TWAs gain profit 
from comprehensive management of migrant workforces rather than from 
manipulation of debt accrued from recruitment, transportation and visa fees.  
These considerations are relevant not only conceptually but also in regulatory terms. 
If TWAs are ‘enterprises in their own right’ (Coe et al., 2010) that provide casual 
migrant workers for just-in-time transnational production rather than simply informal 
recruiters, then regulatory interventions need to respond to this novel situation on the 
ground. There is notably no case law under the ECHR which fully grapples with this 
situation, although there remains scope to address this issue through national level 
implementation of the Palermo Protocol.  
The category of temporary migrant workers seems to be a problematic one for 
international and European law and corporate codes alike. Despite standards set by 




immigration and work-related access to their sovereign domain. The operation of the 
EU PWD ‘disembeds’ temporary workers from host country’s institutional 
employment framework and (thus far) from collective channels of representation. 
Consequently, the posting relationship strengthens competitive subcontracting, 
favouring firms while constraining the rights of workers (Wagner, 2015). Finally, 
corporate codes of conduct offer a voluntary commitment to workers’ rights, but the 
primary motivation remains to maximize profits. So, while Samsung’s ‘Migrant 
Worker Guidelines’ make a commitment to hire migrant workers directly, they also 
envisage hire via TWAs when ‘necessary’ and the extent to which they regulate that 
form of hire is unclear. This necessity is not occasional but has become structural: in 
January 2017, a Samsung plant in Slovakia had 570 permanent and 1000 temporary 
agency workers.15  
Quite counter-intuitively therefore, unfree labour relations do not occur in the absence 
of labour market regulations but rather in the context of a complex ‘overregulated’ 
legal and codified regulatory landscape. The combination of international, regional 
and corporate regulation has established a ‘system of institutional exploitation’ 
(Wagner and Hassel, 2016) of temporary migrant labour so as to utilise wage 
differentials between countries or ‘cost savings authorized by law’ (Gordon, 2017: 
495). This system of exploitation includes unreliable and inadequate payment for 
work, extremely high financial penalties for leaving work, postponement of wages, 
isolated and ‘tied’ accommodation (and provision of such accommodation at an 
unreasonably high cost), as well as obstruction of trade union representation and 






‘Enforcement gaps’ and the ‘fragmentation of norms’ characteristic of the legal 
frameworks governing supply chains (ILO, 2016) allow market competition by 
enabling the supply of temporary migrant labour through work practices that produce 
and maintain unfree labour relations. Our case study demonstrates that ‘normal’ 
functioning of the supply chains is contingent on unfree labour relations which are 
established through new (and legal) forms of labour intermediation whose influence 
has yet to be fully appreciated. We need reform and consolidation urgently, which is 
only possible with due appreciation of the normalization of such practices and the 
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